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ABSTRACT:  Philosophers  before  Friedrich  Nietzsche  are  more  interested  in  reality   
than  in  appearance;  they  tend  to  believe  that  we  can  access  the  ultimate  truth   
through  hard  work,  which  will  set  us  free.  However,  in  his  book,  The  Gay  Science ,   
Nietzsche  criticizes  this  aim  of  science,  or  metaphysics.  While  it  has  been  argued  that   
Nietzsche  denies  the  distinction  between  perceivable  appearances  and  a  concealed,   
underlying  reality,  in  this  paper,  I  will  argue  that  such  a  distinction  is  consistent  with   
Nietzsche’s  project  and  contributes  to  his  perspectivism.   
KEYWORDS:  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  The  Gay  Science,  reality,  appearance   
  
In  his  book,  The  Gay  Science,  Friedrich  Nietzsche  criticizes  the  scientific,  or  metaphysical,  aim                             
of  understanding  the  better  and  more  real  world  distinct  from  our  apparent  world.  While  it  has  been                                   
argued  that  in  The  Gay  Science  Nietzsche  denies  the  distinction  between  perceivable  appearances  and  a                               
concealed,  underlying  reality,  in  this  paper  I  will  argue  that  such  a  distinction  not  only  is  consistent                                   
with  Nietzsche’s  project  but  also  contributes  to  his  perspectivism. 106  First,  I  will  briefly  explain  this                               
distinction  and  why  a  denial  of  the  distinction  between  real  and  appearance  might  seem  to                               
contribute  to  Nietzsche’s  project  in  The  Gay  Science.  Then,  I  will  argue  that  this  distinction  is  in  fact                                     
necessary  for  perspectivism  and  show  that  this  distinction  is  consistent  with  Nietzsche’s  project.     
One  way  to  understand  appearance  is  as  the  totality  of  sensory  experience  regarding  an                             
object.  Take  my  notebook  for  example:  I  can  see  that  it  is  blue;  I  can  feel  that  it  is  impenetrable;  and,                                          
fortunately,  I  can  smell  that  it  is  odorless.  These  qualities  together  compose  an  appearance  for  me.                                 
However,  my  notebook  does  not  appear  in  the  same  way  to  everybody;  my  hypothetical  pet  bat                                 
echolocates  my  notebook  in  a  certain  way  I  can  never  understand.  Thus,  appearances  can  vary                               
between  consciousnesses.  However,  my  hypothetical  pet  bat  and  I  still  wish  to  say  that  we  perceive                                 
the  same  notebook  regardless  of  its  different  appearances.  Thus,  we  posit  a  veiled  objective  reality  of                                 
my  notebook,  a  reality  that  causes  or  is  the  source  of  the  appearance.  In  addition  to  perceptions  of                                     
106  Charles  Guignon  and  Derk  Pereboom,  “Nietzsche,”  in  Existentialism:  Basic  Writings  (Indianapolis:  Hackett  Publishing   
Company,  Inc.,  2001),  97.   
Epistemai  52   
the  object,  a  scientific  view  of  this  notebook’s  reality  may  involve  some  paper  and  ink  molecules                                 
instead  of  sensory  experience.  These  molecules,  together  with  light  and  air,  create  the  appearance  of                               
a  notebook  for  me.  Considering  these  different  perspectives  on  the  same  object  shows  a  profound                               
ontological  distinction  between  appearance  and  reality.      
Other  philosophers  such  as  Descartes  and  Hegel  are  more  interested  in  reality  than  in                             
appearance.  For  example,  Plato  thinks  that  we  shall  study  the  realm  of  forms,  the  ultimate,  eternal,                                 
changeless  reality,  instead  of  the  appearance. 107  Descartes  thinks  that  appearance,  acquired  through                         
our  senses,  actually  hinders  our  study  of  reality;  we  can  only  access  the  ultimate  truth  through                                
reasons. 108  While  Hegel  argued  for  an  “ultimate  reality  that  we  can  come  to  know  through  pure                                 
thought  processes  alone.” 109  Both  believe  that  we  can  access  the  ultimate  truth  through  hard  work,                               
which  will  set  us  free.     
However,  Nietzsche  criticizes  this  belief,  claiming  that:  “[your  love  of  ‘reality’]  has  also  been                             
worked  on  and  woven  by  some  fantasy,  some  prejudice,  some  irrationality,  some  incomprehension,                           
some  fear,  and  whatever  else!” 110  He  believes  that  this  love  of  reality  is  not  only  intrinsically                                 
unfounded  but  also  harmful  because  “sickness  results  from  dreaming  of  a  better  way  of  life  we                                 
might  achieve  in  the  future.” 111  The  idea  of  “a  better  way  of  life”  or  “a  better  world”  refers  to  the                                         
world  on  which  realists  focus.  Although  the  curiosity  for  reality  is  natural  and  prevalent,  Nietzsche                               
believes  that  it  nevertheless  causes  us  sickness.  He  criticizes  this  “hopeless  curiosity”  and  focuses  on                               
the  appearance  by  claiming  that:  “appearance  is,  for  me,  what  is  itself  at  work  and  alive.” 112  For  this                                     
paper,  I  will  not  delve  deeper  into  Nietzsche’s  reasonings  against  the  study  of  reality.  Instead,  I  wish                                   
to  answer  whether  Nietzsche  denies  the  distinction  between  reality  and  appearance.   
107  Richard  Kraut,  “Plato,”  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy  (Fall  2017  Edition).   
108  Gary  Hatfield,  “René  Descartes,”  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy  (Summer  2018  Edition).   
109  Paul  Redding,  "Georg  Wilhelm  Friedrich  Hegel,"  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy  (Winter  2020  Edition).   
110  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  The  Gay  Science,  trans.  Richard  Polt,  in  Existentialism:  Basic  Writings ,  ed.  Charles  Guignon  and  Derk   
Pereboom  (Indianapolis:  Hackett  Publishing  Company,  Inc.,  2001),  section  57.     
111  Guignon  and  Derk,  98.   
112  Nietzsche,  sec.  374,  54.   
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Nietzsche’s  project  seems  to  deny  the  distinction  of  appearance  and  reality  as  a                           
presupposition  for  the  main  subject  of  his  criticism.  According  to  Charles  Guignon  and  Derk                             
Pereboom,  “the  dualistic  opposition  between  appearance  and  reality  paves  the  way  for  a  particular                             
conception  of  our  task  as  humans.” 113  The  particular  conception  of  our  task  refers  to  the  study  of                                   
the  realists,  which  Nietzsche  criticizes.  According  to  this  view,  if  we  do  not  posit  a  reality  behind  the                                     
appearance,  it  would  be  impossible  for  us  to  mistake  and  aim  for  the  reality.  Because  Nietzsche                                 
criticizes  ‘the  task,’  he  might  also  criticize  what  ‘paves  the  way.’  However,  I  argue  that  Nietzsche  does                                   
not  deny  the  distinction  between  reality  and  appearance.     
Nietzsche  writes  that  “we  cannot  see  around  our  own  corner,” 114  a  statement  whose                           
meaning,  I  believe,  is  twofold.  On  one  hand,  human  and  non-human  beings  perceive  differently  due                               
to  their  different  faculties.  On  the  other,  human  beings  interpret  apprehension  with  a  unique  human                               
value.  This  paper  focuses  on  the  latter.  For  example,  we  tend  to  interpret  the  world                               
anthropomorphically:  gods  can  have  human  characteristics;  a  painting  can  be  “beautiful;”  in                         
philosophy,  we  describe  certain  puzzling  reasonings  as  “benign”  but  others  as  “vicious.”  Nietzsche                           
argues  that  the  characteristics  we  impose  on  the  world  are  not  characteristic  of  the  world:  “the                                 
overall  character  of  the  world  is,  for  all  eternity,  chaos…in  the  sense  that  it  lacks  order,  articulation,                                   
form,  beauty,  wisdom,  and  whatever  else  our  aesthetic  anthropomorphisms  might  say.” 115     
An  example  of  this  might  be  that  a  particular  painting  might  seem  beautiful  to  me,  yet                                 
Nietzsche  would  argue  that  my  way  of  interpretation  provides  the  painting  its  beauty.  Without  my                               
interpretation,  the  painting  is  just  a  chaotic  pile  of  colorful  molecules  lacking  any  human-imposed                             
characteristics.  A  distinction  between  appearance  and  reality  arises  from  this  argument:  we                         
experience  our  values  because  we  have  applied  them  to  something,  and  if  we  cannot  apply  them  to                                   
113  Guignon  and  Derk,  98.   
114  Nietzsche,  sec.  374.   
115  Ibid.,  sec.  109.   
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reality,  we  must  apply  them  to  appearances.  If  the  distinction  is  denied  that  we  only  encounter  a                                   
one-layer  world,  we  must  posit  our  values  to  that  layer,  and  there  will  be  no  place  left  for  the  real                                         
chaotic  world.     
One  possible  objection  to  the  necessity  of  the  distinction  between  reality  and  appearance                           
might  be  that  we  do  not  impose  our  values  upon  appearances  as  apprehended.  Rather,  we  impose                                 
our  values  upon  appearances  as  interpreted.  Direct  perception  does  not  come  value-laden.  Thus,                           
Nietzsche  should  abandon  the  distinction  between  reality  and  appearance  for  its  redundancy.  For                           
example,  when  I  perceive  a  painting,  it  is  only  a  collection  of  shapes  and  colors.  However,  once  I                                     
interpret  it  as  a  painting,  I  can  ascribe  to  it  human  qualities  such  as  beauty.  In  this  example,  the                                       
image,  the  collection  of  shapes  and  colors,  is  an  apprehended  appearance,  and  the  interpreted                             
painting  is  an  interpreted  appearance.  Perspectivism  seems  to  survive  without  a  distinction  between                           
reality  and  appearance  by  substituting  in  two  appearance  levels.  However,  I  think  this                           
dual-appearance  argument  necessarily  leads  to  a  dilemma.  One  must  answer  whether  different                         
consciousnesses  encounter  the  same  appearance  as  apprehended.   
In  response  to  this  possible  objection,  I  present  two  possible  responses.  First,  one  can  claim                               
that  different  consciousnesses  do  apprehend  the  same  appearance.  Because  we  interpret  the                         
apprehension  differently,  we  ascribe  different  values  to  the  objects.  I  believe  this  claim  is  problematic                               
because  it  accepts  the  appearance  as  apprehende  as  a  new  name  for  what  was  conceived  of                                 
previously  as  reality.  As  such,  the  appearance  as  apprehended  understood  in  this  way  inherits  any                               
critique  Nietzsche  makes  regarding  reality.  Furthermore,  I  find  the  claim  that  different                         
consciousnesses  do  apprehend  the  same  appearance  untenable  because  (returning  to  my  previous                         
example)  my  hypothetical  pet  bat  and  I  cannot  apprehend  the  same  painting;  I  have  no  knowledge                                 
of  its  echolocation,  and  it  has  no  knowledge  of  my  color  perception.  Although  I  focus  on                                 
Anthropocentric  perspectivism  in  this  paper,  Nietzsche’s  argument  must  apply  to  all  consciousness                         
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across  species.  Thus,  the  same  apprehension  across  species  seems  incompatible  with  the  fact  that                             
different  species  have  different  perceptive  faculties.     
Secondly,  one  can  claim  that  different  consciousnesses  do  not  apprehend  the  same                         
appearance:  sense  data  come  customized.  This  claim  is  also  problematic  because  it  requires  a  causal                               
link  of  identity  between  different  appearances,  even  though  they  share  no  underlying  reality.                           
Perspectivism  is  only  interesting  if  we  have  different  perspectives  of  the  same  thing .  I  have  my                                 
perspective  studying  The  Gay  Science  while  you  have  your  perspective  studying  Beyond  Good  and  Evil .                               
However,  we  do  not  attribute  our  disagreement  to  perspectives.  Our  perspectives  matter  only  if  we                               
study  the  same  book.  Perspectivism  requires  identity,  which  has  to  be  founded  on  a  shared  level  of                                   
appearance  or  reality.  Therefore,  this  option  also  fails.     
One  may  argue  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  posit  a  reality  behind  two  levels  of  appearances.                                 
There  may  be  another  level  of  appearance  behind  the  second  one,  and  so  forth.  It  could  be  “turtles                                     
all  the  way  down.” 116  However,  I  argue  that  if  there  is  one  level  of  appearance  which  looks  the  same                                       
to  all  humans:  a  turtle  large  enough  to  hold  all  of  us  and  our  little  turtles,  then  the  existence  of  that                                           
colossal  turtle  does  all  the  work  reality  does.  You  may  call  it  appearance  founded  on  other                                 
appearances;  however,  Nietzsche's  criticism  of  studying  reality  can  apply  to  the  study  of  that  shared                               
appearance  because  it  is  at  least  two  turtles  down.  Therefore,  we  can  dismiss  the  first  objection.     
Another  possible  objection  to  the  necessity  of  the  distinction  between  reality  and  appearance                           
could  use  a  mereological  argument.  Since  we  cannot  see  through  the  appearances  and  there  are                               
infinitely  many  perspectives,  how  can  we  claim  that  because  there  exists  an  appearance  of  a  building                                 
such  as  the  Parthenon  of  classical  Greek  architecture,  there  is  indeed  a  real  Parthenon  causing  such                                 
appearances?  What  if  the  appearances  of  the  Parthenon  and  the  White  House  share  the  same  cause                                 
in  reality?  Possible  causes  of  appearances  are  ten  a  penny;  what  if  I  have  a  different  cause  of  my                                       
116  Thanks  to  Jacob  Mills  for  this  counterargument. (GLWRU·V1RWH  This  phrase  is  used  here  to  illustrate  the  infinite   
regress  of  appearances.     
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appearance  of  the  Parthenon  every  second?  I  argue  that  these  speculations  might  indeed  be  correct;                               
however,  they  are  not  strong  enough  to  deny  a  distinction  between  appearance  and  reality.  They  only                                 
make  the  already  chaotic  reality  more  chaotic,  on  which  Nietzsche  would  have  no  objections.  Reality                               
and  appearance  do  not  need  a  mereological  alignment  to  establish  their  causal  relationship.  Thus,                             
even  if  we  grant  these  possibilities,  Nietzsche’s  distinction  between  appearance  and  reality  stands.     
I  have  demonstrated  that  it  would  not  be  in  Nietzsche’s  interest  to  deny  the  distinction                              
between  appearance  and  reality  because  it  undermines  his  perspectivism.  Besides,  he  does  not  need                             
to  deny  such  a  distinction  because  his  critique  remains  consistent.  One  possible  evidence  that                             
Guignon  and  Pereboom  cite  is  Nietzsche’s  line  that  “for  us,  there  is  no  ‘reality’–and  not  for  you                                   
either,  you  sober  ones.” 117  Here  Nietzsche  seems  to  deny  reality.  However,  I  believe  he  means  to                                 
deny  a  “reality”  that  exists  without  one’s  humanity  and  animality.  It  is  not  because  there  is  nothing                                   
under  “the  veil”  that  Nietzsche  criticizes  the  realists’  fantasy  of  looking  at  the  “unveiled”  world;                               
instead,  Nietzsche  thinks  that  “the  veil”  is  already  wrapped  around  our  head  and  we  cannot  and                                 
should  not  attempt  to  unwrap  it.  There  most  likely  exists  something  left  under  the  veil  for  us  to  look                                       
at,  whose  existence  does  not  interfere  with  Nietzsche’s  main  criticism  of  the  science.  Thus,  Guignon                               
and  Pereboom’s  interpretation  on  this  issue  is  a  bit  too  strong.     
Perspectivism  requires  an  intrinsic  distinction  between  reality  and  appearance,  and                     
Nietzsche’s  critique  of  scientific,  or  metaphysical  aims  does  not  need  to  culminate  in  a  denial  of  this                                   
distinction.  We  can  remain  consistent  by  staying  within  our  reach  of  apprehension.  Nietzsche                           
criticizes  only  the  transcendental  trespassing  of  value  assigning.  Like  almost  everyone,  Nietzsche                         
does  not  wish  to  deny  a  painting  can  still  be  beautiful;  however,  his  critique  focuses  on  our                                   
transcendent  claim  that  beauty  resides  within  the  reality  of  the  painting  because  he  argues  beauty,                               
along  with  other  anthropomorphic  virtues,  has  no  role  within  the  realm  of  reality.  A  sickness  arises                                 
117  Ibid.,  sec.  57.   
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from  the  goal  to  understand  the  reality,  about  which  we  should  remain  agnostic.  Instead,  we  should                                 
attribute  a  painting’s  beauty  to  our  interpretation,  which  is  based  on  appearance.  Thus,  Nietzsche                             
does  not  need  to  deny  the  distinction  to  criticize  the  aim  to  study  reality;  all  he  needs  to  do  is                                         
criticize  science’s  presumption  that  it  can  have  a  god’s  eye  view  from  a  nowhere  perspective,  instead                                 




Guignon,  Charles,  and  Derk  Pereboom.  “Nietzsche.”  In  Existentialism:  Basic  Writings,  93-118.   
Indianapolis:  Hackett  Publishing  Company,  Inc.,  2001.   
Hatfield,  Gary.  “René  Descartes.”  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy  (Summer  2018   
Edition),  edited  by  Edward  N.  Zalta.  URL  =   
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/descartes/>.   
Kraut,  Richard.  “Plato.”  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy  (Fall  2017  Edition),  edited  by   
Edward  N.  Zalta.  URL  =  <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/plato/>.   
Nietzsche,  Friedrich.  The  Gay  Science.  Translated  by  Richard  Polt.  In  Existentialism:  Basic  Writings ,   
edited  by  Charles  Guignon  and  Derk  Pereboom,  123-171.  Indianapolis:  Hackett  Publishing   
Company,  Inc.,  2001.     
Redding,  Paul.  "Georg  Wilhelm  Friedrich  Hegel."  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy  (Winter   
2020  Edition),  edited  by  Edward  N.  Zalta.  URL  =   
< https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/hegel/ >.   
